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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DISABILITY AND THE DUTIES OF POTENTIAL PARENTS
JANET MALEK*

I. INTRODUCTION
Potential parents face an ever-expanding array of choices about
whether, when, and how to have children. Of particular ethical concern to
disability scholars are reproductive genetic technologies that give potential
parents control over the characteristics of their future children.1 These
technologies enable potential parents to select for or against particular
traits, including traits considered to be disabling.2 This possibility raises
many questions about the ethical implications of such choices.
This article first considers one possible position on disability and the use
of reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) based upon the Strong Claim,
and argues that there are at least several reasons to believe that it is a
plausible view. This article then describes and critically evaluates a family of
objections to claims such as the disability rights critique and offers several
conclusions about how these perspectives should be balanced by potential
parents making reproductive choices.
II. THE STRONG CLAIM EXPLAINED
The Strong Claim provides that potential parents are morally required to
use reproductive genetic technologies to reduce the likelihood that their
future children will have a serious disability when the burdens of doing so
are reasonable. Before discussing the Claim’s plausibility, it is helpful to
clarify what, precisely, the Strong Claim contends. First, the Strong Claim
* Assistant Professor, Department of Medical Humanities, Brody School of Medicine, East
Carolina University. Ph.D., Rice University, 2004. The author’s current research addresses
ethical issues related to reproduction, the use of assisted reproductive technologies, and the
use of genetic technologies. The author would like to thank the participants and attendees of
the Saint Louis University School of Law’s 2008 Symposium on Disability, Reproduction, and
Parenting for their comments and suggestions.
1. Ronald M. Green, Parental Autonomy and the Obligation Not to Harm One’s Child
Genetically, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 5, 5 (1997).
2. Dan W. Brock, The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms - The Case of Wrongful
Handicaps, 9 BIOETHICS 269, 269-70 (1995) (discussing, for example, screening for “diseases
and conditions less severe or grave as to be compatible with having a life worth living.”).
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states that parents can be morally required to use RGTs. The Claim,
therefore goes a step beyond suggesting that it is morally permissible for
potential parents to use these technologies—a relatively weak (and less
controversial) claim. By stating that parents are morally obligated to use
RGTs under certain circumstances, the Strong Claim proposes a normative
guide for potential parents making decisions about reproduction.
Importantly, however, the Strong Claim does not advocate any legal
restrictions or requirements for potential parents. The moral correctness of a
choice may be one factor that helps determine whether that choice should
be legally forbidden, permitted, or required, but this factor must be
balanced alongside numerous other considerations. The Strong Claim
therefore in no way entails that potential parents should be legally required
to use RGTs under any circumstances.
RGTs combine assisted reproductive technologies and genetic
technologies to enable potential parents to influence the characteristics of
the children they may conceive.3 There are several types of RGTs currently
available to potential parents.4 Prior to conception, genetic testing of
oocytes is possible for some traits via polar body analysis.5 For example,
polar bodies can be removed from an in vitro oocyte (just after insemination
but before the genetic material from the gametes merge) and tested for the
presence of the extra chromosomes that cause trisomies 13, 18, and 21.6
In contrast, genetic testing cannot be performed on sperm before
conception because such testing involves the destruction of the cells.7
However, sperm sorting, in which sperm carrying an X chromosome are
separated from those carrying a Y chromosome, can be used to select the
sex of the future child.8 Potential parents may choose to use this technology

3. Janet Malek, Understanding Risks and Benefits in Research on Reproductive Genetic
Technologies, 32 J. MED. & PHIL. 339, 341-42 (2007).
4. Id. (examples of RGTs include sperm sorting, preconception genetic diagnosis, and
preimplantation genetic diagnosis).
5. M. Durban et al., PGD in Female Carriers of Balanced Robertsonian and Reciprocal
Translocations by First Polar Body Analysis, 7 HUM. REPRODUCTION UPDATE 591, 591-92
(2001).
6. See, e.g., S.A. Gitlin et al., Oocyte Biology and Genetics Revelations from Polar
Bodies, 6 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE, 403, 404–08 (2003); Nat’l Inst. of Health,
Stem Cell Information, at http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/glossary.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2009)
(defining “polar body” and describing how it undergoes meiosis); M. Plachot, Genetic Analysis
of the Oocyte – A Review, 24 PLACENTA (SUPPLEMENT 2) S66, S67-68 (2003) (describing one
test for analyzing polar bodies and abnormalities in chromosomes 13, 16, 18, 21, and 22).
7. Y. Verlinksy & C.M. Strom, Preconception Diagnosis of Polar Bodies, Preconception &
Preimplantation Diagnosis of Human Genetic Disease 233, 233 (Robert G. Edwards, ed.,
1993).
8. Bonnie Steinbock, Sex Selection: Not Obviously Wrong, in REPROD. TECHNOLOGIES: A
READER 57, 58-59 (Thomas A. Shannon ed., 2003); see Edgar Dahl et al., Preconception Sex
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to increase the likelihood that they have a girl, for example, in order to
prevent their future child from having an X-linked genetic disorder such as
Lesch-Nyhans Syndrome.9
A broader array of genetic tests can be used after conception.10
Embryos created as a result of in vitro fertilization can be tested using
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to determine which embryos will be
implanted in a potential mother’s uterus.11 PGD involves the removal and
genetic analysis of a single cell from each available embryo, so only those
embryos that do not carry a particular gene, such as the gene for
Huntington’s disease, can be selected for implantation.12 Additionally,
prenatal diagnosis via amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling, and other
methods can be used to test developing fetuses for many genetic conditions
including cystic fibrosis, Tay Sachs disease, and spina bifida.13 Although
these different types of RGTs raise different ethical issues, each may be used
to reduce the likelihood that a future child will be affected by a disabling
condition. Acceptance of the Strong Claim, therefore, could require the use
of any of these technologies.
The term “future child” in the Strong Claim refers to a child who may
come into being as a result of its potential parents’ reproductive decisions.
The term is not meant to denote anything about the moral status of that
entity or to equate it with existing children. The concept of a “serious
Selection Demand and Preferences in the United States, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 468, 468
(2006).
9. Lawrence J. Nelson, Preimplantation Diagnosis, 30 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 67, 76
(2003); see also Steinbock, supra note 8.
10. See Am. Ass’n for Clinical Chemistry, Lab Tests Online, Pregnancy & Prenatal Testing,
at http://labtestsonline.org/understanding/wellness/pregnancy.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
For example, genetic testing for inherited diseases, hemoglobin disorders, and cystic fibrosis
carriers can be performed before or after conception, whereas testing for fetal abnormalities
and risks such as Down syndrome screening, triple or quad marker screening, chronic villus
sampling, amniocentesis, and cordocentesis can be performed after conception. Id.
11. Reprod. Health Tech. Project, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, Fact Sheet, at
www.rhtp.org/fertility/documents/PGDFactSheet.doc (last visited Jan. 7, 2009); see also JON
W. GORDON, THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF ENGINEERING THE HUMAN GERM LINE: MENDEL’S MAZE
174 (2003).
12. Reprod. Health Tech. Project, supra note 11; GORDON, supra 11.
13. See, e.g., AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., PATIENT’S FACT SHEET, GENETIC SCREENING
FOR BIRTH DEFECTS (2005), available at www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheets/genetic_
screening.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2009); see also Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders &
Stroke, Spina Bifida Fact Sheet (2007), available at www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/spina_
bifida/detail_spina_bifida.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (explaining the use of amniocentesis
for prenatal diagnosis of spina bifida); see also Cynthia M. Powell, The Current State of
Prenatal Genetic Testing in the United States, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 44,
47 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000) (describing additional procedures required for
definitive diagnosis of neural tube impairments or chromosome abnormalities).
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disability” plays a central role in the Strong Claim. Jonathan Glover argues
that “[d]isability requires failure or limitation of functioning. But a limitation
of functioning creates disability only if (on its own or via social
discrimination) it impairs capacities for human flourishing.”14 That is, for a
condition to be correctly classified as a disability, two conditions must be
met: first, a disability must involve a departure from “normal human
functioning”;15 second, that departure has to negatively affect the
individual’s opportunity to pursue “a good human life”.16 Although there
may be significant disagreement as to what humans require to flourish or
live a good life, there may be less disagreement about the capacities
needed for individuals to pursue that goal.17 When these capacities are
compromised, the future child will face greater challenges in pursuing a
good life. The inclusion of the qualifier “serious” in the Strong Claim
creates room for interpretation that makes the scope of the Claim somewhat
ambiguous. Disabilities cannot be dichotomously classified as serious or
not serious; rather, each disability falls somewhere along a continuum of
seriousness. Where to draw the line differentiating serious from non-serious
disabilities along that continuum is a matter for debate at another time. For
the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to identify paradigm conditions that
clearly fall into the “serious” category. Conditions such as Tay-Sachs
disease and Trisomy 13 are unquestionably serious disabling conditions.18
Cystic fibrosis and fragile X syndrome may also cause serious disabilities.19
These conditions and others that diminish a future child’s “capacities for
human flourishing”20 to an equivalent extent are therefore covered by the
Strong Claim.
Finally, the Strong Claim only applies to cases in which the burdens of
using RGTs are reasonable.21 The financial and emotional costs associated
14. JONATHAN GLOVER, CHOOSING CHILDREN: GENES, DISABILITY, AND DESIGN 9 (2008).
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 10.
18. See Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders & Stroke, Tay-Sachs Disease Information
Page, at www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2009)
[hereinafter NINDS Tay-Sachs Information]; see also U.S. Nat’l Libr. of Med., Genetics Home
Reference, Trisomy 13, at http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition=trisomy13 (last visited Jan. 7,
2009).
19. See U.S. Nat’l Libr. of Med., Medline Plus, Cystic Fibrosis, at www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/print/cysticfibrosis.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009); see also U.S. Nat’l Libr. of
Med., Medline Plus, Fragile X Syndrome, at www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/print/fragilex
syndrome.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
20. GLOVER, supra note 14.
21. See Powell, supra note 13, at 50 (describing the risks of prenatal diagnostic
procedures); see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Res., Prenatal Testing: Should You
Consider It?, at www.mayoclinic.com/health/prenatal-testing/PR00014 (last visited Jan. 7,
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with the use of these technologies can be significant. To evaluate their
reasonableness, the burdens must be estimated relative to the expected
benefits. The Strong Claim does not apply if the burdens of using RGTs are
too high relative to the expected benefits. In other words, the anticipated
benefits of employing RGTs must be significant and likely enough to
outweigh the anticipated costs of using the technology. It would be
impossible to develop a comprehensive list of specific situations in which this
condition is met.
However, multiple variables are relevant to this
determination, including: the condition in question (such as inheritance,
severity, expressivity, and penetrance), the type of technology being
considered (whether it involves pre-conception selection, PGD, or prenatal
diagnosis), and characteristics of the potential parents (such as their age,
financial situation, and other moral beliefs).22
III. DEFENDING THE STRONG CLAIM
At least three arguments can be made in support of the Strong Claim as
defined, supra. Although this article focuses on the disability rights critique
of the Strong Claim, it seems appropriate to articulate why the Strong Claim
and other similar claims are plausible. The Strong Claim is supported by
the validity of promoting the well-being of future children. By Glover’s
definition, disabilities are conditions that limit individuals’ “capacities for
human flourishing.”23 By its nature, human flourishing—however it is
understood—is good for people. Thus, future children are better off if their
opportunity to pursue a good life is not limited by disability. The choice to
use RGTs to prevent disability therefore promotes future children’s wellbeing because that choice makes it more likely that those future children will
be able to flourish.
Some authors maintain that arguments about future children’s wellbeing do not make sense when applied to decisions about an individual
future child.24 They claim that it is not possible to improve the well-being of
a particular child by using RGTs because the use of these technologies
affects the identity of the individual brought into being.25 In other words,
2009); U.S. Nat’l Libr. of Med., Genetics Home Reference, What Are the Risks and Limitations
of Genetic Testing?, at http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/testing/riskslimitations (last visited
Jan. 7, 2009).
22. See U.S. Nat’l Libr. of Med., Medline Plus, Prenatal Testing, at www.nlm.nih.gov/med
lineplus/print/prenataltesting.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (describing the patient population
appropriate for prenatal testing); see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Res., supra note
21 (describing screening and diagnostic tests); U.S. Nat’l Libr. of Med., supra note 21
(describing factors to be considered when contemplating prenatal testing).
23. GLOVER, supra note 14.
24. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 356-57 (1989).
25. Id. at 202.
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when a potential parent chooses to use RGTs to conceive a child, that
decision changes the genetic identity of the child conceived. The child who
would otherwise have been conceived, therefore, is no better off as a result
of the potential parent’s choice because, due to that decision, he or she
does not exist. Even if one is persuaded by this argument, the Strong Claim
can still be defended on the grounds that it promotes the well-being of
future children. Rather than claiming that the use of RGTs promotes a
particular child’s well-being, it can be claimed that the use of these
technologies promotes the well-being of future children as a group.26
Understood this way, potential parents can make the class of future children
better off by using RGTs to prevent disability.
Although the claim that potential parents are morally required to make
their future children better off is intuitively plausible whether future children
are considered individually or as a group, the Strong Claim can also be
supported by a second argument that focuses on the nature of the
relationship between parents and children.
Parents have a special set of obligations to their children. The choice to
bring a person into being generates responsibilities for the individual
making that choice. As a result of being created, children are vulnerable to
a variety of harms that they would not otherwise be at risk of experiencing
(because they otherwise would not have existed). Parents have a moral
obligation to attempt to mitigate this vulnerability whenever possible
because their decision to conceive creates it. Using RGTs to prevent serious
disabilities is one way of reducing future children’s vulnerability to harm and
therefore is one way that potential parents can fulfill this obligation. All
other things being equal, a future child who has a serious disability is at a
greater risk of experiencing pain, suffering, and other harms due to his or
her limited capabilities compared to a future child who does not.27 Thus it
may be argued that reducing the likelihood that a future child will have such
a disability is morally required by the special nature of the parent-child
relationship.

26. Brock, supra note 2, at 271-72.
27. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Res., Children’s Health: Down Syndrome,
at www.mayoclinic.com/health/downsyndrome/DS00182/DSECTION=complications (last
visited Jan. 7, 2009) (explaining that children with Down syndrome often have an increased
likelihood of developing life-threatening heart problems, leukemia, infectious disease, and
dementia); NINDS Tay-Sachs Information, supra note 18 (noting that children with Tay-Sachs
experience a relentless deterioration of mental and physical abilities, become blind, deaf, and
paralyzed, and usually die by age four); Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke,
Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome Information Page at www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/lesch_nyhan/
lesch_nyhan.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (explaining that children who inherit Lesch-Nyhan
syndrome have symptoms including severe gout, poor muscle control, moderate retardation,
and self-mutilating behaviors, and often die due to renal failure before the age of twenty).
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Finally, the plausibility of the Strong Claim can be supported by a third
line of reasoning. The requirement for potential parents to use RGTs under
some circumstances can be defended by analogy to paradigm cases of
parental responsibility. Parents are morally (and legally, in many cases)
required to use car seats for their children when driving with them in the
car.28 They are expected to provide adequate nutrition, clothing, and
shelter for their children.29 And they are obligated to seek proper medical
care when their children are affected by treatable medical conditions.30 All
of these paradigm imperatives protect children from limitations on their
capacity to pursue a good life. RGTs provide another method by which
potential parents can seek to reduce their future children’s likelihood of
experiencing such limitations. Therefore, requiring parents to use RGTs to
prevent disability, at least under some circumstances, would be consistent
with the argument that parents are morally required to take the abovementioned precautions for their children.
These three arguments suggest that the Strong Claim is plausible. As
may be expected, a number of objections have been raised to claims like
the Strong Claim.31 Reviewing and analyzing all of these objections is far
beyond the scope of this article and the focus of this journal issue. Thus, the
following discussion will present and evaluate one important subset of these
objections.

28. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 307.179 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 13A (2008);
CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315 (2008) (Missouri, Massachusetts, and California are examples of
states that require all passengers under age 16 to wear a safety belt); see also Ins. Inst. for
Highway Safety, Highway Loss Data Inst., Child Restraint Laws, at www.iihs.org/laws/
ChildRestraint.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (summarizing the child restraint laws for all fifty
states).
29. See generally Catherine S. Taylor, Children’s Right to an Adequate Standard of
Living, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., Summer 2002, at 17, 17-20 (summarizing the fifty-four provisions
under Article 27 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which includes
basic nutrition, clothing, and housing); see also JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT CASES 337 & n.267 (3rd ed. 1997) (referencing People v. Rippberger, 231 Cal. App.
3d 1667, 1687-88, (1991) (holding that parents have a legal duty to maintain their children
that includes proper nutrition and shelter)).
30. See, e.g., MYERS, supra note 29, at 337–43 & n.269 (referencing Commonwealth v.
Twitchell, 617 N.E. 2d 609, 612 (Mass. 1993) (holding that “parents have a duty to seek
medical attention for a child”)); In re Faridah W., 579 N.Y.S. 2d 377, 378 (1992) (holding
that a parent has a “non-delegable affirmative duty to provide a child with adequate medical
care, which has been determined to be that degree of care exercised by ordinarily prudent
loving parents who are anxious for the well-being of their child.”).
31. See, e.g., Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal
Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug.
1999, at S2.
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A. The Expressivist Argument
The expressivist argument is a cornerstone in the family of objections to
views like the Strong Claim known collectively as the “disability rights
critique.”32 According to the expressivist argument, when potential parents
use RGTs to select against disabling conditions in their future children, they
express something negative to and about people living with those
conditions.33 Such choices send the discriminatory message to these
individuals that their lives are less worthwhile than the lives of people who
do not live with disabilities.34 Adrienne Asch explains that the use of RGTs
to prevent disability in future children is morally problematic because
this one characteristic of the embryo or fetus is the basis for the decision not
to continue the pregnancy or to implant the embryo. That decision . . .
concludes that one piece of information about a potential child suffices to
predict whether the experience of raising that child will meet parental
expectations.35

In other words, the use of these technologies lets one single characteristic
represent the entire person, sending the hurtful message that the only
relevant trait of those who live with disabilities is the disability itself.36 If this
argument is sound, accepting something like the Strong Claim would be
morally problematic because it communicates this hurtful message by
advocating the use of RGTs to reduce the likelihood that future children will
have a disability.
The soundness of the expressivist argument can be challenged by at
least three lines of reasoning. First, its conclusion can be refuted on
semantic grounds. It is not clear that the choice to use RGTs to reduce the
likelihood that a future child will have a disability sends any message to or
about existing people living with disabilities. The choice to use RGTs, in and
of itself, may communicate nothing at all. James Lindemann Nelson argues
that in order for an action to send any kind of message, the action must
have a publicly accepted meaning.37 Unless this type of connection
between an action and a message exists, the action itself communicates
nothing.38 The choice to use RGTs does not seem to have any such agreed-

32.
33.
34.
35.

See id.
Id.
Id.

Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven’t Changed My Mind About Prenatal Diagnosis:
Reflections and Refinements, in PRENATAL TESTING & DISABILITY RIGHTS 234, 236 (Erik Parens &
Adrienne Asch eds., 2000).
36. Parens & Asch, supra note 31, at S2.
37. James Lindemann Nelson, Prenatal Diagnosis, Personal Identity, and Disability, 10
KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 213, 216–17 (2000).
38. Id. at 217 (stating that a behavior must have “semantic significance”).
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upon meaning, and thus that choice itself expresses nothing at all.39
Further, even if the choice to use RGTs was publicly associated with some
meaning, that meaning may be unrelated to the value of the lives of existing
or future people with disabilities. That choice may instead communicate
something about the individuals making reproductive decisions or
something about the particularities of their situation. Potential parents
choose to use RGTs for a variety of reasons, many of which have nothing to
do with the value of the lives of people who live with disabling conditions.40
Second, the expressivist argument is problematic because it proves too
much. If using RGTs to prevent disability in future children is morally
objectionable because it sends a negative message about those living with a
disability, it seems to follow that the use of other methods of preventing
disability in children would also be morally objectionable for the same
reason. For example, many parents choose to vaccinate their children to
prevent diseases that would limit their future opportunities.41 However, the
conclusion that a parent’s choice to give his or her child a vaccine against a
particular disease sends a negative message to or about those people living
with that disease is intuitively implausible. Therefore, if the expressivist
argument leads to this conclusion, the argument must be unsound.
Supporters of the expressivist argument have responded to this criticism
by claiming that RGTs are importantly different from other methods of
preventing disability.42 Methods such as medical treatment, vaccination,
and prevention education target one particular threat to the individual while
respecting the other traits that constitute that individual’s identity.43 In
contrast, the use of RGTs currently requires the acceptance or rejection of
whole gametes, embryos, or fetuses based on a single characteristic,

39. Id.
40. See Allen Buchanan, Choosing Who Will Be Disabled: Genetic Intervention and the
Morality of Inclusion, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Summer 1996, 18, 45-46; see also Colin
Gavaghan, Right Problem, Wrong Solution: A Pro-Choice Response to “Expressivist” Concerns
About Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 20, 25
(2006).
41. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Why Immunize?, at www.cdc.gov/
vaccines/vac-gen/why.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (describing the future benefits which
result from vaccine use); see Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, What Would Happen If
We Stopped Vaccinations?, at www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/whatifstop.htm (last visited Jan.
7, 2009) (describing the benefits of vaccines).
42. Erik Parens & Adrienne Ash, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing:
Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 3, 16 (Erik
Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000). Other methods of preventing disabilities include “taking
folic acid to reduce the likelihood of spina bifida or eschewing medication that is known to
stunt the growth or harm the organs or limbs of a developing fetus.” Id.
43. See id. (explaining that the use or nonuse of some other methods of preventing
disability are designed to protect the developing fetus).
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thereby dismissing the value of that entity’s other identity-determining
traits.44
This line of reasoning fails because it relies on an overly simplistic
understanding of individual identity. An in-depth analysis of the various
theories of identity is outside the scope of this article; however a brief
summary of two possible rebuttals may be helpful. Nelson has argued that
the use of non-RGT methods of preventing disability may, in fact, alter the
identities of the individuals on whom they are used.45 The use of such
methods could affect the individuals’ genetic structures or their life
experiences to such a significant extent that they become, in a morally
relevant sense, different people.46 If this is true, almost any approach to
preventing disability would constitute a rejection of an entire individual and
not only the rejection of a particular trait.47 An alternate rebuttal is the
opposite view: that neither RGTs nor other methods of preventing disability
change the identity of the future child in a morally relevant sense. The
identities of future children should be understood in a way that creates
continuity among a potential parent’s genetically distinct possible future
children.48 If the choice to use RGTs to prevent disability is not viewed as
identity-determining, that choice may express disvalue for the particular trait
being prevented but not for the individual who has that trait.49 Regardless of
which understanding of identity is used, if either of these rebuttals is sound,
RGTs are not different from other methods of preventing disability in the way
that supporters of the expressivist argument need them to be.
Third, the expressivist argument can be refuted on grounds that there is
at least one morally relevant difference between future children and existing
people: existing people have full moral status while future children do not.50

44. See id. at 15.
45. Nelson, supra note 37, at 221.
46. Id. at 223-24.
47. Id. at 224-25.
48. Janet Malek, Identity, Harm, and the Ethics of Reproductive Technology, 31 J. MED. &
PHIL. 83, 91-92 (2006). This argument is more intuitively appealing for some types of RGTs
than for others. When choosing among gametes to use in creating a child, it is easier to see
the various genetically distinct possible children as one “future child” than to do so in the
context of prenatal testing. Nonetheless, this continuity of identity is possible in both contexts.
49. See generally id. at 90-92 (discussing a child’s “narrative identity” as consisting of not
just one particular trait, but as many traits and narratives that all evolve into the narrative
identity).
50. Laurence B. McCullough & Frank A. Chervenak, A Critical Analysis of the Concept
and Discourse of ‘Unborn Child,’ 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS, 34, 36 (2008). A key piece of the
disability rights critique is that using RGTs with the intention of preventing disability is morally
problematic in a way that making reproductive choices for other reasons is not. Therefore, it
would not be inconsistent for a supporter of the expressivist argument to agree with this
statement.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DISABILITY AND THE DUTIES OF PARENTS

2008]

129

While moral status may be voluntarily conferred upon future children, it can
also be withheld, at least until the fetus becomes viable.51 Once an entity
gains (or is given) full moral status, that entity must be respected as a unique
individual with a complete set of defining characteristics.52 However, this is
not necessarily true for future children.53 Choices involving future children
are therefore fundamentally different from those involving existing
individuals. As a result of this difference, the argument that making choices
about future children communicates something about the lives of certain
existing individuals requires a logical jump that cannot be defended.
These three refutations of the expressivist argument raise serious doubts
about its conclusions. It therefore provides little evidence that the Strong
Claim and similar claims are morally problematic. Disability rights
advocates, however, have formulated two other disability-based arguments
against claims like the Strong Claim: the “Parental Attitudes Argument” and
the “Loss of Support Argument.”

B.

The Parental Attitudes Argument

A second piece of the disability rights critique is the assertion that the
Strong Claim promotes undesirable attitudes of potential parents toward
parenthood.54 Asch and Parens contend that, “[g]ood parents will care
about raising whatever child they receive and about the relationship they will
develop, not about the traits the child bears.”55 The Strong Claim runs
counter to this position, advocating that parents make choices to select
against particular traits in their future children rather than embracing
whichever traits the “natural” process would otherwise select. If potential
parents are morally required to use RGTs to prevent disability in future
children, they will look at those future children differently, viewing them
though a lens of judgment instead of unconditional acceptance.56 These
technologies therefore promote inappropriate attitudes toward parenthood
on the part of potential parents.
One response to this argument takes the same approach as the second
refutation of the expressivist argument, discussed above. If using RGTs to
prevent disability in future children encourages undesirable parental

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 35-39.
Id. at 37.
See id. at 38.

Parens & Asch, supra note 31, at S5.
Id. at S6.
See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE
REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 96 (2004), available at www.bioethics.gov/reports/
reproductionandresponsibility/_pcbe_final_reproduction_and_responsibility.pdf (last visited
Jan. 7, 2009).
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attitudes, would using other methods of preventing disability have the same
effect? A defender of the parental attitudes argument might claim that these
two types of disability prevention methods are fundamentally different
because using RGTs changes the identity of the future child whereas other
prevention methods do not. As argued previously, this response is not
convincing because depending on the theory of personal identity used, it
could equally be the case that both types of methods change the future
child’s identity, or that neither does.57
Secondly, the parental attitudes argument assumes that unconditional
acceptance of a future child as a whole requires the unconditional
acceptance of each of that future child’s traits. This assumption clearly
seems unjustified, as it is possible for a parent (or sibling or spouse) to have
unconstrained love and complete acceptance for a child (or sibling or
spouse) without embracing each of their specific qualities. Parents work to
shape children’s behavior (and couples work through differences) even
though they would not love their children (or spouses) any less if those
efforts were to fail. In the same way, potential parents may use RGTs as a
way of reducing the likelihood that their future children will have a disability,
but nonetheless may love them just much if the child is born with a disability.
A general assumption that an attempt to alter the traits of a future child
reflects a conditional acceptance of the future child therefore cannot be
defended, even if it may be correct in some cases.
A third response to the parental attitudes argument raises questions
about another assumption integral to that position. William Ruddick argues
that there are various legitimate concepts of conception, pregnancy, and
parenthood.58 The parental attitudes argument’s presumption that the only
morally justifiable paradigm for these projects is unconditional acceptance is
therefore mistaken.59 Other paradigms in which the future child is viewed
as the result of a maternal project or in which the good of the family as a
whole is prioritized may also be morally acceptable.60 If so, the parental
attitudes argument assumes the moral correctness of an overly simplistic and
possibly inaccurate understanding of what conception, pregnancy, and
parenthood are about.
This line of thought can be taken further to suggest that morally correct
attitudes toward parenthood actually support, and perhaps require, the use
of RGTs to prevent disability in future children. Unconditional acceptance is

57. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
58. See Parens & Asch, supra note 42, at 17-19.
59. Id. at 18.
60. See id. at 19 (for example, a “projectivist” or “familial” paradigm “is compatible with
trying to ensure that any child they raise has characteristics that accord with these parental
goals.”).
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not the only criterion upon which parental attitudes should be evaluated. A
desire to help one’s children be the best they can be is also a feature of
laudable parental attitudes. In fact, parents who do not work to give their
children the tools they need to pursue a good human life are considered to
have a negligent approach to parenting.61 On this criterion, then, the
choice to use RGTs to prevent disability in future children is squarely in line
with appropriate parental attitudes. Although it is possible for one of these
criteria to be met to the exclusion of the other, a balance between the two is
not only acceptable but morally desirable.

C. The Loss of Support Argument
A third disability rights-based objection to claims like the Strong Claim is
the “loss of support” argument.62 According to this position, if RGTs are
routinely used to reduce the likelihood that future children will be affected by
disability, the community of people living with disability will shrink.63
Proponents of this argument maintain that as the numbers of people living
with disability become smaller, “public support for those who have
disabilities will dwindle.”64 Fewer resources will be allocated for disability
accommodation and support for these accommodations will become
insufficient to preserve them.65
As Allen Buchanan and colleagues note, the soundness of the loss of
support argument depends on empirical evidence that is currently
unavailable.66 As an initial matter, the effect of the widespread acceptance
of the Strong Claim on individuals living with a disability is unknown.67
Further, there are many different causes of disabling conditions.68
Conditions for which a genetic test is available are only one such cause;
individuals also acquire disabilities through events that happen during and

61. See generally id. (explaining that some parents view their child’s outcome as a
reflection of their own parenting skills); Ruthbeth Finerman, ‘Parental Incompetence’ and
‘Selective Neglect’: Blaming the Victim in Child Survival, 40 SOC. SCI. MED. 5, 11 (1995).
62. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 266
(2000).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 266–68. For example, “[w]hen the number of individuals suffering from a
particular malady is small enough, it may not be profitable for pharmaceutical companies to
produce drugs valuable to these individuals.” Id. at 268.
66. Id. at 266.
67. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 62 at, 266-67.
68. See generally id. at 268 (discussing blindness as a result of contact with gonococcus
bacteria during vaginal delivery); Alta California Regional Ctr., Causes of Developmental
Disabilities, at www.altaregional.org/whoWeServe/causesOfDisabilities/ (last visited Jan. 7,
2009) (listing nine different causes of developmental disabilities).
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after birth.69 It seems unlikely, therefore, that the numbers of people living
with disabilities would be radically reduced as a result of general
acceptance of the Strong Claim. Second, even if the numbers of individuals
living with disabilities were to diminish significantly, it is unclear what effect
that change would have on the practice of accommodation.70 While it does
seem possible that support for those living with disabilities could be reduced
as a result of the widespread use of RGTs, it is equally possible that this
would not be the case. If RGTs were widely used to prevent disabilities,
those who have a disability could in fact be better accommodated because
the available resources could be used to assist fewer individuals. The
existing social imperative to provide accommodations for those living with
disabilities is not based on a cost-benefit analysis demonstrating that these
accommodations are worthwhile investments because of the numbers of
individuals who benefit from them. Instead, these accommodations are
justified by reference to the rights of those individuals living with disabilities
and to the demands of justice. As a result, the existing imperative to
accommodate the disabled is unlikely to be affected by the number of
individuals who are members of that community and it seems possible that
the level of support for those living with disabilities would increase, or at
least remain unchanged.
A slightly different, perhaps more plausible, version of the loss of
support argument could be articulated as follows: acceptance of the Strong
Claim could create a public perception that disabilities are the result of
parental choice. If such disabilities are viewed as the result of individuals’
voluntary choices rather than as a result of the random natural lottery, the
argument that those disabilities must be accommodated could be
undermined. Such a shift in the public’s attitude toward those who are born
with disabilities could result in a decrease in the services made available to
individuals born with disabilities. As Michael Sandel has eloquently
suggested, “the explosion of responsibility for our own fate, and that of our
children, may diminish our sense of solidarity with those less fortunate than

69. See generally BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 62 at, 268. For example, some causes of
developmental disabilities after child birth include childhood accidents, drug and toxic
substance poisoning through ingestion, delivery of very large or very small infants, metabolic
disorders, malnutrition, RH blood disease, and intrauterine and other infectious diseases
including rubella, cytomegalovirus infection, toxoplasmosis, syphilis, herpes, and enterovirus
infections. Alta California Regional Ctr., supra note 68.
70. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 266–267 (explaining that there is no
evidence that a loss of support for disabled persons would result if the disabled population
decreased in size).
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ourselves.”71 As a result, support for those “less fortunate” individuals could
be reduced.
Again, the persuasiveness of this objection is impossible to evaluate
without empirical evidence to support its key premises. There are examples
of cases in which an increased emphasis on individual responsibility has led
to decreased support (such as smokers being charged more for health
insurance than non-smokers) and vice versa (such as support for treatment
of alcohol abuse increasing as alcoholism became recognized as a disease
rather than a bad habit).72 Even so, our current system of disability
accommodation does not differentiate between those whose disabilities are
a result of the natural lottery and those whose disabilities are a result of their
own risky decisions.73 It is unclear whether this precedent would change if
the Strong Claim or similar claims were to be more widely accepted.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article considered three important disability-based objections to the
Strong Claim or similar positions, and there are multiple grounds on which
to question the persuasiveness of each of these objections. Certainly, some
readers will find these responses unconvincing. It is therefore worthwhile to
consider where this analysis stands if the responses to these three objections
fail. First, assume that the use of RGTs to prevent disability in future children
sends a negative message to those who live with disability. Second, assume
that the Strong Claim advocates parental attitudes that are morally
problematic. Finally, assume that support for those living with disabilities
would be diminished as a result of the widespread use of RGTs. These
objections fail to prove conclusively that the Strong Claim is misguided or
that potential parents cannot have a moral duty to use RGTs to reduce the
likelihood that their future children will have a serious disability.
If sound, these three ethical arguments would have to be balanced
against other relevant ethical arguments to determine whether the Strong
Claim is morally defensible. It would be necessary to take all of these
ethical considerations into account and to make a judgment about which
considerations are the most important. The objections of the disability rights
critique would weigh heavily in this judgment. But are they important
enough to outweigh the moral arguments in favor of the Strong Claim?

71. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF GENETIC
ENGINEERING 89 (2007).
72. See generally Meredith Minkler, Personal Responsibility for Health? A Review of the
Arguments and the Evidence at Century’s End, 26 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 121, 128–31
(1999).
73. See Tom Shakespeare, Choices and Rights: Eugenics, Genetics and Disability
Equality, 13 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 665, 678–79 (1998).
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Several of these arguments were previously discussed in this article:74 acting
in accordance with the Strong Claim may be a way of promoting the wellbeing of future children, may be required by the special responsibilities
generated by the nature of the parent-child relationship, and may be in line
with the imperative to fulfill other parental duties. To evaluate the
defensibility of the Strong Claim, a judgment about which set of ethical
considerations is more important must be made.
The ethical considerations that support the Strong Claim are more
important than those that undermine it. The value of preventing a future
child from having limited opportunities to pursue a good life and the moral
obligation to protect a child from vulnerability seem to be weightier factors
in the evaluation process than the value of not sending negative messages
to those living with disability, the importance of appropriate parental
attitudes, and the benefit of avoiding a possible reduction in support for
disability accommodation. The former are more important than the latter
for potential parents making reproductive decisions because it is not only
permitted but expected that a parent be partial to the interests of their
children. In other words, it is appropriate for a potential parent to consider
the effects of a choice for her future child first and for other individuals
second. This ranking of interests is reflected in the Strong Claim.
Making reproductive decisions consistent with the Strong Claim is not
always easy for potential parents. Nor would widespread acceptance of the
Strong Claim or similar claims be without negative consequences.
Nonetheless, this article demonstrates that the Strong Claim is morally
defensible despite disability-based arguments to the contrary.

74. See notes 23-30 and accompanying text.

